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We present a dual-process risk perception model that integrates cognitive and
emotional as well as consequentialist and deontological components by distin-
guishing between two modes of evaluative processing: (a) a consequentialist eval-
uation that focuses on potential consequences and (b) a deontological evaluation
that focuses on moral values. Each of these two modes is assumed to trigger speci-
fic cognitive evaluations, specific emotions, and specific behavioral tendencies
concerning a perceived risk. We conducted an experiment (N = 270) that tested
whether the relative dominance of the two evaluative modes would depend on the
causal structure of the environmental risk being evaluated and on the social role of
the evaluator. Three types of causal structure were varied by providing scenario
information: (a) anthropogenic risks that endanger only nature, (b) naturally
caused risks with potential harmful consequences for humans, and (c) anthro-
pogenic risks that may harm humans. Participants evaluated each scenario from
the perspective of one of three social roles: mayor, expecting parent, and environ-
mental activist. For each scenario, participants specified their focus and evaluated
the event’s morality and perceived risk, the intensity of specific emotions, and
their preferences for prospective behaviors. Results showed that the consequen-
tialist evaluation was generally stronger than the deontological evaluation and was
less affected by the experimental manipulations. The deontological evaluation
was substantially affected by the risk’s causal structure. It was stronger for anthro-
pogenic than for natural causation; risks caused by humans were associated with
greater perceived moral blameworthiness, more intense morality-based emotions
(e.g. outrage), and a stronger tendency to perform agent-related behaviors (e.g.
aggression) than naturally occurring risks. The effect of the social role was
less pronounced than that of the causal structure. Furthermore, the effect of an
evaluative focus on behavior was fully mediated by emotions for deontological
evaluations and partially mediated for consequentialist evaluations. The implica-
tions for environmental risk perception and communication are discussed.
Keywords: risk perception; environmental risks; emotion; morality; dual process
model
Introduction
Two topics have become increasingly popular in the risk perception literature:
emotion and morality (Böhm and Tanner 2013; Roeser 2010). Beginning more than
two decades ago (Pfister and Böhm 1992), affect and emotion have become a ‘hot’
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topic in the areas of risk perception and decision-making (Peters et al. 2006), and
several authors have documented the manifold ways in which judgments, risk per-
ceptions, and decision-making are influenced by emotions (e.g. Loewenstein and
Lerner 2003; Pfister and Böhm 2008; Roeser 2010; Slovic 2010; Zeelenberg et al.
2008). Likewise, morality has been increasingly emphasized as an important issue
that plays a role in people’s risk evaluations (e.g. Böhm and Pfister 2000, 2005;
Ericson and Doyle 2003; Sjöberg 2000). It has even been argued that moral consid-
erations are primary and shape our understanding of actions and events (Knobe
2007). It seems that environmental risks in particular are considered moral issues by
many people (Böhm and Tanner 2013; Feinberg and Willer 2013; McDaniels,
Axelrod, and Slovic 1995).
A model of the risk evaluation process that explicitly incorporates both emotion
and morality was proposed by Böhm and Pfister (2000, 2005; see also Hendrickx
and Nicolaij 2004). They distinguish consequentialist evaluations from deontological
evaluations and show that these two types of evaluations result in different types of
emotional reactions and trigger different types of behavior. We aimed to test several
aspects of this model. First, for both emotions and behaviors, the model implies a
distinction between consequence-related and morality-related ones. We wanted to
test this classification of emotions and behaviors. Second, the model assumes that
people focus on either consequences or deontological considerations when they eval-
uate a risk event. We wanted to investigate whether people’s focus depends on two
types of influences, namely, on features of the risk event, on the one hand, and on
contextual factors, on the other hand. A fundamental feature of a risk is the risk’s
causal structure, that is, the types of causes that have brought about the event and
the types of consequences that may occur. A fundamental contextual feature is the
evaluator’s social role (e.g. politician, parent).
In the next section, we describe Böhm and Pfister’s model in more detail. We then
present an experiment in which we presented participants with scenario information
about fictitious environmental risks. By varying the information given in a scenario
about the causes and consequences of the environmental risk, we manipulated the
risk’s causal structure. In addition, we instructed participants to evaluate the risk from
the perspective of one of three social roles (mayor, expecting parent, and environmen-
tal activist) that we assumed would differ in the extent to which they shifted the focus
of attention to either consequence-related or morality-related aspects of the risk event.
We measured participants’ evaluative focus (consequentialist vs. deontological), their
cognitive judgments of the risk scenario (consequentialist and moral judgments), their
emotional reactions, and their behavioral tendencies vis à vis the risk scenario. In the
results section, we first report the results of analyses that tested whether emotions and
behavioral tendencies could be classified as consequence-related vs. morality-related.
We then present the effects of causal structure and social role on the evaluative focus,
cognitive judgments, the intensity of emotional reactions, and the strength of the
behavioral tendencies that were triggered by the risk scenario. We conclude with a
mediation analysis that tested the prediction that the effect of an evaluative focus on
behavioral tendencies would be mediated by emotional reactions.
The process of subjective risk evaluation
Böhm and Pfister (2000, 2005; Böhm 2003) proposed a dual process model that
postulates two modes of risk evaluation and several stages within each mode.
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According to the model (Figure 1), the vantage point of the risk evaluation process
is a mental representation that the person constructs from available information. The
most important components are the causes and consequences that the person ascribes
to a risk event, construing a causal mental model of the risk event. As an example,
think of an oil spill. Among other things, a person’s mental representation of the oil
spill contains the causes and consequences that the person ascribes to the spill. The
person may believe, for example, that the spill was brought about by a reckless ship
crew that disregarded safety measures, and that the spill will result in the deaths of
many sea birds.
It is assumed that two modes of evaluative processing operate on the mental rep-
resentation of a risk event: (a) a consequentialist evaluation, which focuses on poten-
tial consequences and their harmfulness, and (b) a deontological evaluation, which
focuses on the involved actors and their actions and on the question of whether any
moral values or norms are violated. Each of these two modes is assumed to trigger
specific cognitive judgments, specific emotional reactions, and specific behavioral
tendencies. This connection between cognitions, emotions, and behaviors builds
strongly on appraisal theories of emotion (Frijda 2006).
A consequentialist focus leads to consequentialist judgments (e.g. the estimated
severity and probability of consequences), consequence-based emotions (e.g. fear
triggered by the anticipation of future harmful consequences), and consequence-re-
lated behaviors (behaviors that are aimed at preventing, avoiding, or alleviating
harmful consequences, e.g. cleaning up an oil-polluted beach). A deontological
focus, on the other hand, is associated with judgments of moral reprehensibility,
morality-based emotions (emotions triggered by the violation of moral norms, e.g.
Figure 1. Dual-Process model of risk evaluation.
Journal of Risk Research 3
outrage), and agent-related behaviors (behaviors that are directed toward the causal
agent, the villain, and are aimed at retaliation or punishment, e.g. boycotting the
company that owns the wrecked oil tanker).
The model is a variant of a dual-process model; note, however, that the two
modes proposed here differ from those postulated in most other dual process
theories. Usually, dual process models distinguish analytic-deliberate from
intuitive-automatic processing (Kahneman 2011; for dual process theories in the risk
perception literature, see e.g. Loewenstein et al. 2001; Slovic et al. 2004). Böhm
and Pfister, by contrast, distinguished consequentialist from deontological
evaluation, both of which can be more or less analytical or intuitive. For example, a
cognitive judgment about the riskiness of consequences can be intuitive and
automatic if based on a recognition process from memory (Klein 1993); a moral
judgment, on the other hand, can be deliberate and analytical if the actions to be
judged constitute a moral dilemma (Knobe 2007).
Böhm and Pfister (2000) showed that the relative dominance of the two evalua-
tive modes is influenced by the causal structure of the risk event. In their study,
deontological evaluation increased with the ease with which responsibility and
blame could be ascribed. They presented environmental risk scenarios. Deontologi-
cal evaluations were more intense if the risk event was caused by human activity
than when it was caused by nature. Such evaluations were most intense when a sin-
gle human agent could be identified. Consequentialist evaluations, on the other
hand, were influenced by the consequences of the event and were more intense
when the consequences affected humans than when they affected nature (see also
Böhm and Pfister 2005).
One of the aims of the present study was to investigate whether, in addition to a
risk’s causal structure, other factors would influence whether a person would focus
on consequences or on morality when evaluating a risk event. We studied one poten-
tial additional factor, namely, the evaluator’s social role. We assume that, like any
kind of cognitive processing, risk evaluation is affected by contextual factors that
influence the mental representation of a risk event and the processing of information.
One potentially important factor is a person’s social role, which entails higher order
and long-term goals. A social role represents a stereotype, which, according to con-
strual-level theory (Liberman and Trope 2014), will activate high-level, abstract
goals, and values. For example, parents are concerned about their child’s well-being,
managers strive to ensure their company’s prosperity, and students aim for a good
education. Goals, in turn, guide information processing (Anderson 1983) and deci-
sion-making (Krantz and Kunreuther 2007), and determine which aspects of infor-
mation people consider to be relevant and focus on when explaining others’
behavior (Böhm and Pfister 2015b). This is not to say that people focus on their
higher order goals all the time, but if such goals are activated in a situation, the
goals filter how information is processed and which corresponding low-level con-
crete construals will emerge in particular situations. With respect to risk evaluation,
we assume that people’s social roles influence their evaluative focus, or, stated dif-
ferently, that people in different social roles differ in their evaluative focus.
We selected three social roles that would be likely to differ in the relative impor-
tance that a person in this role would assign to consequentialist and deontological
considerations: mayor, expecting parent, and environmental activist. We assumed
that mayors would have a strong interest in the future economic prosperity of their
community and would therefore primarily take on a consequentialist perspective.
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Environmental activists, by contrast, should take a strong moral stance because they
regard nature as a value in itself that should not be compromised. Expecting parents
should take a middle position and may focus on both consequences and morality;
we assumed that the expectation of having a child would, on the one hand, raise an
interest in the prospective material and physical well-being of the child and, on the
other hand, activate moral norms such as a responsibility to future generations.
These assumptions were based on the simple common sense idea that people
differ in their general interests and values and that, through a combination of self-
selection and learning processes, systematic differences may exist between different
social roles. For example, several studies have shown that economists focus more
on self-interest and profit maximization than students from other disciplines or the
rest of the population (Cipriani, Lubian, and Tago 2009; Kirchgässner 2005).
The present study
The present study pursued two aims. First, we wanted to confirm the theoretical
distinction between consequence-based and morality-based emotions as well as the
distinction between consequence-related and agent-related behaviors. Second, we
wanted to test the effects of the risk’s causal structure and the evaluator’s social role
on the relative dominance of consequentialist vs. deontological evaluation.
We adopted the general procedure used by Böhm and Pfister (2000, 2005). We
provided scenario information about fictitious environmental risk events such as an
oil spill. We manipulated the risk’s causal structure by varying the scenario informa-
tion. We distinguished between Böhm and Pfister’s (2000, 2005) three types of cau-
sal structure, which were based on the assumption that the most basic distinctions in
the perceived causal structure of environmental risks are between anthropogenic and
natural causation, on the one hand and between consequences for humans and those
for the natural environment on the other: (1) EM-Risks (Environment-Man) are natu-
rally caused environmental changes that pose risks for humans (e.g. volcano erup-
tions). (2) MEM-Risks (Man-Environment-Man) are anthropogenic human-caused
environmental changes that may harm humans (e.g. deforestation). (3) ME-Risks
(Man-Environment) are anthropogenic environmental changes that jeopardize the
natural environment without necessarily affecting humans (e.g. agriculture leading to
the extinction of rare species). Note that these distinctions constitute a continuum
rather than disjoint categories. Causal structure was manipulated by providing partic-
ular information about the causation and the potential consequences of the risk
event.
We expected consequentialist evaluations to be stronger when the potential con-
sequences affected humans (causal structures EM and MEM) than when they
affected nature (causal structure ME). Consequently, we expected perceived risk to
be higher, consequence-based emotions (e.g. fear) to be more intense, and conse-
quence-related behavioral tendencies (e.g. help) to be stronger for EM and MEM
risks than for ME risks.
We expected deontological evaluations to be stronger for anthropogenic (causal
structures ME and MEM) than for natural causation (causal structure EM). Conse-
quently, perceived moral blameworthiness, morality-based emotions (e.g. outrage),
and agent-related behavioral tendencies (e.g. boycott) were predicted to be stronger
for ME and MEM risks than for EM risks.
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Social role was manipulated by instructing participants to take the perspective of
one of three social roles (mayor, parent, environmental activist), each described by a
short text. An alternative to inducing the roles experimentally would have been to
select participants who took on these roles in their real lives. However, this would
have come with the disadvantage that people in these roles would have differed on
an infinite number of other features that may or may not have something to do with
their role as a mayor, activist, or parent so that the comparison would have been dif-
ficult to interpret. In addition, these roles are not exclusive in that, for example, a
mayor or activist can also be a parent. We therefore decided to increase experimental
control by inducing the roles, even if that meant that we had to ask participants to
assume a role that was only hypothetical for them.
We expected consequentialist evaluation to increase from environmental activist
to expecting parent to mayor. Likewise, consequentialist judgments, the intensity of
consequence-based emotions such as fear, and consequence-related behavioral ten-
dencies such as help were expected to increase from environmental activist to
expecting parent to mayor. The opposite pattern across the social roles was expected
for deontological evaluation. That is, deontological evaluation, and with it moral
judgments, the intensity of morality-based emotions such as outrage, and agent-
related behavioral tendencies such as boycotting were expected to increase from
mayor to expecting parent to environmental activist.
We conducted a paper-and-pencil experiment in a student sample. Each participant
was presented with two risk scenarios of the same type. After each scenario, we mea-
sured evaluative focus (consequentialist vs. deontological), cognitive judgments such
as perceived risk and perceived moral blameworthiness, the intensity of several conse-
quence-based and morality-based emotional reactions, and the tendency to perform
each of a number of consequence-related and agent-related behaviors (Figure 1).
Method
Participants
Two hundred seventy undergraduate and graduate students at the University of
Bremen (Germany) participated in the study. They were equally distributed across
three study programs: economics, biology, and psychology. They received a mone-
tary incentive of €7.50 for their participation. Age ranged from 19 to 54 years
(M = 24.60, SD = 5.18); 56.8% were female.
Design and procedure
All materials were presented in a questionnaire. Two fictitious scenarios were pre-
sented; each of them described an environmental risk event. We will refer to the two
scenarios as the island scenario and the oil scenario, respectively.
Two independent variables were manipulated. The first independent variable
was social role with the three levels mayor, expecting parent, and environmental
activist. Social role was manipulated by instructing participants to imagine that
they were in one of these roles. We then asked them to evaluate the scenario from
the perspective of this role. The instructions for the social role inductions are
given in Appendix 1. The second independent variable was causal structure with
three levels: ME-Risks (Man-Environment), EM-Risks (Environment-Man), and
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MEM-Risks (Man-Environment-Man). Causal structure was manipulated by vary-
ing the information given about the causes and the potential consequences of the
risk event. Thus, for both the island and oil scenarios, we constructed three vari-
ants that corresponded to the three types of causal structure. The scenarios are
described in Appendix 2.
For each scenario, we measured the dependent variables evaluative focus, per-
ceived risk, perceived moral blameworthiness, consequence-based emotions, moral-
ity-based emotions, consequence-related behavioral tendencies, and agent-related
behavioral tendencies.
After a general introduction, the questionnaire began by inducing the social role.
Then the first scenario was presented, followed by the dependent variables for the
first scenario. Participants were then reminded of their social role, and the second
scenario was presented, followed by the dependent variables for the second scenario.
All materials were in German. Participants needed about an hour to complete the
questionnaire.
Measures
Most measures were adopted from Böhm and Pfister (2005). The following depen-
dent variables were measured:
Evaluative focus
Evaluative focus refers to whether a participant focuses on future consequences or
on deontological considerations. We employed two measures of evaluative focus:
(1) A forced-choice task in which we provided two arguments for why the poten-
tial damage described in the scenario should be prevented. One argument was
deontological (… because, in principle, such an event must not happen); one
was consequentialist (… because the consequences would be very serious).
Participants selected the argument that they considered more persuasive.
(2) A rating task in which we presented two considerations. One was deontologi-
cal (… whether any human and/or animal rights are violated), and the other
consequentialist (… what negative consequences for humans and/or nature
might occur and how serious they would be). Participants indicated how
important each consideration was to them when trying to form an opinion
about the risk event. Judgments were given on a seven-point rating scale
ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important).
Cognitive judgments
Moral blameworthiness. Participants rated the extent to which they considered the
situation described in the scenario to be morally blameworthy (rating scale ranging
from 1 = not at all to 7 = very strongly). Blameworthiness served as an indicator of
moral judgment.
Perceived overall riskiness. Participants rated how likely the situation would be to
lead to harmful consequences (rating scale ranging from 1 = very unlikely to
7 = very likely). Riskiness served as an indicator of consequentialist judgment.1
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Emotional reactions
We selected twelve specific emotions of which seven were consequence-based
emotions (worry, fear, sorrow, sadness, pity, helplessness, hopelessness) and five
were morality-based emotions (anger, fury, outrage, indignation, contempt). These
emotions were selected on the basis of the findings from Böhm and Pfister (2005;
Böhm 2003); for a theoretical account, see Pfister and Böhm (2008) and Tangney,
Stuewig, and Mashek (2007). For each emotion, participants applied a seven-point
rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) to rate how intensely they
felt the emotion when thinking about the risk scenario. The emotions are listed in
Table 1.
Behavioral tendencies
We presented eleven behaviors. For each behavior, participants indicated the degree
to which they felt inclined to perform it in the situation that was described in the sce-
nario (seven-point rating scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = definitely). The
behavioral tendency items are listed in Table 2. The behaviors were selected on the
basis of Böhm and Pfister (2005); in their study, these behaviors formed three behav-
ioral types that were motivated by different emotions: help, aggression, and escape.
Manipulation checks
We measured the following variables as manipulation checks:
Ease of empathizing with the social role. Participants were asked how well they
were able to relate to the induced social role. Judgments were given on rating scales
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very well).
Perceived human causation. Participants rated the extent to which the situation was
caused by humans; the rating scale ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly).
Perceived risk for humans. Participants rated how high they considered the risk for
humans on a rating scale ranging from 1 = very low risk to 7 = very high risk.2
Perceived risk for nature. Participants rated how high they considered the risk for
nature on a rating scale ranging from 1 = very low risk to 7 = very high risk.3
Results
We will first report the results for the manipulation checks. We will then report the
results of analyses on the structure of emotions and behavioral tendencies by means
of principal component analyses. These were applied to investigate whether the
hypothesized taxonomy of consequence-based and morality-based emotions and that
of consequence-related and agent-related behaviors was supported. We will then
report the results of analyses of variance that tested the effects of social role and
causal structure on evaluative focus, cognitive judgments, emotional reactions, and
behavioral tendencies. Finally, we will present the results of the analyses that tested
the mediating role of emotions.
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Manipulation checks
Check of causal structure manipulation
The causal structure of a risk was defined by the combination of a cause with a
consequence, both of which were specified in the risk scenario. The cause was var-
ied as either anthropogenic (ME, MEM) or of natural origin (EM). The measure of
perceived human causation served as a manipulation check for this distinction. The
consequences of a risk were varied as affecting either humans (MEM, EM) or nature
(ME). The measures of perceived risk for humans and perceived risk for nature
served as manipulation checks for the consequence part of the causal structure
manipulation.
Perceived human causation. A separate analysis of variance was computed for each
scenario with human causation as the dependent variable and causal structure as the
independent variable. The main effect of causal structure was significant for the
island scenario, F(2, 266) = 90.8, p < .001, as well as for the oil scenario, F(2, 266)
= 175.8, p < .001 (the island scenario means were EM = 3.1, MEM = 5.9,
ME = 6.2; the oil scenario means were EM = 3.2, MEM = 6.7, ME = 6.8). A post
hoc contrast comparing risks with natural causation vs. risks with human causation
(EM vs. MEM + ME) yielded significant differences for both the island scenario, t
(266) = 13.4, p < .001, and the oil scenario, t(266) = 18.8, p < .001. Thus, we con-
cluded that with respect to causation, the causal structure of the scenarios was
manipulated successfully. Scenarios that were portrayed as caused by humans were
more strongly attributed to human causation than scenarios portrayed as due to a
natural cause.
Perceived risk for humans and for nature. We computed two separate simple analy-
ses of variance for each scenario with perceived risk for humans and perceived risk
for nature, respectively, serving as the dependent variable, and causal structure as
the independent variable. For the island scenario, there were significant effects of
causal structure on perceived risk for humans, F(2, 266) = 8.1, p < .001, and per-
ceived risk for nature, F(2, 267) = 14.1, p < .001; the respective means were
EM = 3.6, MEM = 3.9, and ME = 2.6 for risk for humans and EM = 4.1,
MEM = 4.8, and ME = 5.6 for risk for nature. Pairwise post hoc contrasts concern-
ing risk for humans showed significant differences between the EM and ME scenar-
ios, t(266) = 3.02, p = .007, and between the MEM and ME scenarios, t(266) = 3.8,
p < .001, consistent with the manipulation. Concerning risk for nature, all contrasts
showed significant differences – t(266) = 2.5, 5.3, 2.8, p = .038, p < .001, p = .013,
for EM vs. MEM, EM vs. ME, and MEM vs. ME, respectively – which were also
consistent with the manipulation.
For the oil scenario, however, neither risk for humans nor risk for nature was
significantly affected by the scenario’s causal structure. The means for risk for
humans showed the expected pattern (EM = 5.0, MEM = 4.9, ME = 4.6), whereas
risk for nature was basically the same for all variants of the scenario (EM = 6.3,
MEM = 6.2, ME = 6.2).
In sum, the variation in the consequences as part of the causal structure manipu-
lation was successful for the island scenario but not for the oil scenario (Figure 2).
An analogous result was obtained by Böhm and Pfister (2005).4
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Check for the social role manipulation
Participants indicated the degree to which they were able to relate to the social role
induced by the experimental manipulation on a seven-point rating scale. For each
role and scenario, the means on this item were well above the scale midpoint of 4
for the island scenario (M = 4.4, 4.7, and 4.6 for mayor, parent, and activist, respec-
tively) and for the oil scenario (M = 4.7, 5.3, and 5.0). According to one-sample
t-tests, all means were significantly greater than 4.0 (all ts(89) > 3.0, all ps < .001).
We concluded that the social role manipulation was successful because partici-
pants were able to relate to their roles to sufficient degrees.
Structural analyses
Structure of emotions
We hypothesized that emotions elicited by environmental risks could be classified as
consequence-based and morality-based emotions. We analyzed the structure of the
emotion ratings by applying a principal component analysis with varimax rotation.
We conducted two separate analyses for the island and oil scenarios, respectively.
Both analyses yielded three components, as indicated by both the Kaiser criterion
and the scree plots. Table 1 shows the table of loadings. Three components
explained 70.0% of the variance in the island scenario and 68.1% in the oil scenario.
The solutions for the two scenarios were virtually identical. The first two compo-
nents supported the distinction between morality-based and consequence-based emo-
tions. The first component comprised morality-based emotions (outrage, anger,
indignation, fury, contempt), the second consequence-based emotions (worry, sor-
row, fear, sadness). The three emotions with high loadings on the third component
Figure 2. Manipulation check. Perceived risk for humans and for nature as a function of
causal structure.
Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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(helplessness, hopelessness, pity) had been conceptualized as consequence-based
emotions, but they formed a separate component. We labeled it a resignation factor
but excluded it from further analyses, leaving it as a topic for further research. The
three components clearly replicated Böhm and Pfister’s (2005) results.
For each scenario, we computed two emotion indices, one for morality-based
emotions and one for consequence-based emotions. The indices were computed by
averaging the emotions with the highest loadings (>.40) on the respective factor
(see Table 1) for each index. The indices showed satisfactory internal consistencies
(morality-based: α = .917 and α = .909 for the island and oil scenarios, respec-
tively; consequence-based: α = .852 and α = .790 for the island and oil scenarios,
respectively).
Structure of behavioral tendencies
The structure of the behavioral tendencies was explored in a manner analogous to
the emotion ratings. The behavioral tendency ratings for the island and oil scenarios
were analyzed with two separate principal component analyses. Both the Kaiser cri-
terion and the scree plot suggested a three-component solution for both scenarios.
The rotated loadings (varimax rotation) are shown in Table 2. Three components
explained 63.9% (island scenario) and 60.6% (oil scenario) of the variance. The
solutions for the two scenarios were highly similar. The first two components sup-
ported our hypothesized classification of behaviors as consequence-related and
agent-related behaviors. The first component captured behaviors that focused on
alleviating damage; we labeled it tendency to help. The second component summa-
rized yelling at and hitting the responsible agent; we labeled it tendency to be
aggressive. The third component (feeling like running away and wanting to forget
everything) could be interpreted as tendency to escape. For each of the three compo-
nents, we computed an index by averaging the behavioral tendencies with the high-
est loadings (>.40) on the respective factor (see Table 2). Two behavior items (pour
out my heart and crying) were not included in any index because they exhibited
inconsistent loading patterns in the two scenarios. The internal consistencies of
the indices for help and aggression were satisfactory: Cronbach’s alpha was α = .841
(island scenario) and α = .800 (oil scenario) for help and α = .805 (island scenario)
and α = .828 (oil scenario) for aggression. The escape index, by contrast, was not
sufficiently internally consistent (αs below .6); we excluded it from further analyses.
Effect of causal structure and social role on model variables
We will now report the results for the effects of the independent variables causal struc-
ture and social role on the components of the risk evaluation model (see Figure 1):
evaluative focus (consequentialist vs. deontological), cognitive judgments (conse-
quentialist vs. moral), emotional reactions (consequence-based vs. morality-based),
and behavioral tendencies (consequence-related vs. agent-related).
With respect to the effects of causal structure, we predicted that a consequential-
ist evaluation would be stronger when the potential consequences affected humans
(causal structures EM and MEM) than when they affected nature (causal structure
ME). Deontological evaluation, by contrast, was predicted to be stronger when the
risk event was caused by humans (causal structures ME and MEM) than when it
was caused by natural processes (causal structure EM).
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Concerning the effect of social role, we predicted that deontological evalua-
tions would increase across the social roles from mayor to expecting parent to
environmental activist. The opposite pattern was expected for consequentialist
evaluations.
All subsequent results are summarized in Table 3, which corresponds to the
stages in Figure 1. The general pattern of analysis was to compute a separate analy-
sis of variance for each scenario, as well as for each dependent variable; causal
structure and social role were entered as independent variables, resulting in a 3 × 3
design with two between-subjects factors.
Evaluative focus
Argument choice. Participants chose which of two arguments they considered more
persuasive: a consequentialist or a deontological one. The choice frequencies are
given in Table 4. Visual inspection of the frequencies showed that across all condi-
tions, the consequentialist argument was chosen more frequently than the deonto-
logical one. For both scenarios, the frequencies clearly differed across the causal
structure conditions: in accordance with our hypothesis, the deontological argument
was selected more frequently for anthropogenic risks (MEM and ME) than for
risks caused by nature (EM). Social role, by contrast, had no effect on argument
choice.
We tested the effect of causal structure and social role on argument choice via
logistic regression analyses. We computed separate analyses for the two scenarios.
In each analysis, the dichotomous argument choice served as the dependent variable
(with the deontological argument coded 0 and the consequentialist argument coded
1), and causal structure and social role were entered as predictors. Social role did
not yield a significant main effect in either analysis. The effect of causal structure on
argument choice, by contrast, was found to be significant (likelihood ratio test);
island scenario: χ2 (2) = 17.43, p < .001; oil scenario: χ2 (2) = 16.54, p = .001. In
both analyses, the probability of choosing the deontological argument increased sig-
nificantly for MEM and ME risks compared with EM risks (the reference category).
A combined analysis yielded no significant difference between the scenarios
(Table 3(a-i)).
Argument rating. The second measure of evaluative focus asked participants to rate
the importance of each of two arguments, which were of a consequentialist and a
deontological type. Using each argument type in turn as the dependent variable and
separately for each scenario, four 3 × 3 analyses of variance (Causal Structure ×
Social Role) were computed. Table 3(a-ii) shows that the only significant effect was
the impact of social role on the deontological argument in the island scenario, indi-
cating that deontological considerations (i.e. moral concerns) become more impor-
tant when moving from mayor to parent to activist (Figure 3), thus partially
confirming our hypothesis. Causal structure, however, had no significant impact on
the importance of either argument type; we found only weak evidence that the
importance of the deontological argument was affected by causal structure in the oil
scenario, suggesting that moral considerations are especially important when the
cause involves humans (the means were EM = 4.9, MEM = 5.5, ME = 5.3).
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Cognitive judgments
Perceived riskiness and moral blameworthiness were taken as indicators of conse-
quentialist and moral judgments, respectively. Separately for each indicator and each
scenario, a 3 × 3 analysis of variance (Causal Structure × Social Role) was computed
(Table 3(b); Figure 4). For the island scenario, we found a significant effect of cau-
sal structure on moral judgments (Table 3(b)). Although the main effect of social
role was not significant, a comparison contrasting the role of mayor with the roles
of parent and activist yielded, as hypothesized, a significant difference: parents and
activists judged the scenario as morally more blameworthy than did mayors, t(261)
= 2.2, p = .042 (the means were mayor = 3.3, parent = 3.8, activist = 3.9). A signifi-
cant main effect of causal structure on moral judgments was also found for the oil
scenario. Concerning consequentialist judgments (i.e. perceived riskiness of the
scenarios), no effects were found for either scenario.
Emotional reaction
The two indices for consequence-based and morality-based emotions as derived
from the principal component analyses (see Table 1) were used as indicators of the
intensity of morality-based and consequence-based emotional reactions, respectively.
Separately for each indicator and each scenario, a 3 × 3 analysis of variance (Causal
Structure × Social Role) was computed (Table 3(c); Figure 5, left pane). The effect
of causal structure on morality-based emotions was significant for the island scenario
as well as for the oil scenario (Table 3(c)). A significant main effect of causal struc-
ture on consequence-based emotions was found only for the island scenario. Social
role yielded no significant effects on emotional reactions.
Figure 3. Evaluative focus. Importance of deontological and consequentialist arguments as
a function of social role.
Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Behavioral tendencies
Indices for consequence-related and agent-related behavioral tendencies were
derived from the principal component analysis (see Table 2), corresponding to ten-
dencies to help those who suffer from consequences and to aggressive tendencies
toward the causal agents of the risk. Again, separate 3 × 3 analyses of variance
(Causal Structure × Social Role) were computed for each indicator and each scenario
(Table 3(d); Figure 5, right pane; Figure 6). For the island scenario, social role had a
Table 4. Evaluative focus: Number of participants who selected the deontological or the
consequentialist argument as more persuasive.
Island scenario Oil scenario
Risk type
Argument EM MEM ME EM MEM ME
Morally principled 7 24 27 12 34 30
Consequentialist 83 66 63 78 56 59
N 90 90 90 90 90 89
Social role
Argument Mayor Parent Activist Mayor Parent Activist
Morally principled 19 21 18 25 24 27
Consequentialist 71 69 72 65 66 62
N 90 90 90 90 90 89
Figure 4. Cognitive judgments. Moral (blameworthiness) and consequentialist (perceived risk-
iness) judgments as a function of causal structure and social role (averaged across scenarios).
Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 5. Emotional reactions (left) and behavioral tendencies (right) as a function of causal
structure (averaged across scenarios).
Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 6. Behavioral tendencies as a function of social role.
Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
18 G. Böhm and H.-R. Pfister
marginal effect on agent-related and a significant effect on consequence-related
behaviors; causal structure significantly affected agent-related behaviors. For the oil
scenario, significant effects were found for causal structure on agent-related behavior
and for social role on consequence-related behavior (Table 3(d)). Specifically, partic-
ipants experienced a stronger tendency to perform agent-related behaviors (aggres-
sion) when reading a scenario about an anthropogenic risk (MEM, ME) than when
confronted with a risk brought about by a natural cause (EM) (Figure 5, right pane).
In general, behavioral tendencies increased from the EM to the MEM and ME cau-
sal structures (the means across scenarios and behavioral types were EM = 3.4,
MEM = 4.0, ME = 4.1); also, there was an increase from the mayor and parent roles
to the activist social role (the means across scenarios and behavioral types were
mayor = 3.7, parent = 3.7, activist = 4.2) (Figure 6).
Mediation analyses
The analyses of variance examined whether causal structure and social role individu-
ally affected each of the stages postulated in the dual process model. The assump-
tions of the model were actually more specific. Once the focus was directed toward
either the consequences or the deontological aspects, the unfolding of a causal
sequence of processes was assumed. Along the consequentialist path, the focus on
negative consequences was expected to lead to judgments of riskiness, which were
then expected to elicit various consequence-based emotions, which, in turn, were
expected to trigger consequence-related behavioral tendencies such as a desire to
help. Along the deontological path, the focus on violations of moral principles was
postulated to lead to judgments of moral blame, which elicit morality-based emo-
tions, which finally trigger a tendency to engage in agent-related behaviors such as
aggressive acts. As explained in the introductory section, we did not expect that peo-
ple would focus exclusively on either one of the paths; only a relative dominance of
one focus over the other was expected.
Table 5. Mediation analyses testing the consequentialist and the deontological paths.
Island scenario Oil scenario
Effect CI (95%) Sig. Test Effect CI (95%) Sig. Test
Consequentialist path
Indirect (mediated) effect .186 [.101, .284] p < .001 .202 [.118, .300] p < .001
Partial direct effect .465 [.320, .609] p < .001 .338 [.168, .507] p < .001
N 266 265
Deontological path
Indirect (mediated) effect .197 [.119, .287] p < .001 .205 [.113, .307] p < .001
Partial direct effect .049 [-.086, .181] p = .424 −.049 [-.189, .091] p = .490
N 260 258
Notes: (a) In each analysis, one of the two argument ratings (a focus on consequences or on violation of
rights, respectively) served as the independent variable, one of the emotion indices (consequence-based
emotions or morality-based emotions, respectively) served as the mediator, and one of the behavioral
tendency indices (consequence-related behaviors/help or agent-related behaviors/aggression, respec-
tively) served as the outcome variable. (b) The Sobel test (Sobel 1982) was used to test the significance
of the mediated effect; the t-test from the multiple regression model was used to test the significance of
the direct effect. Mediation analysis according to Baron and Kenny (1986) as well as the causal media-
tion framework according to Tingley et al. (2014) and the SEM-based approach (Rosseel 2012) were
used to estimate the effects; all approaches yielded virtually identical results.
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These cause-effect sequences could not be strictly tested with our data because
we did not experimentally manipulate the intervening variables. What we could test
with a mediation analysis was whether the regressive structure was compatible with
a mediating causal structure (Baron and Kenny 1986; MacKinnon 2008). We specifi-
cally focused on the pivotal role of emotions as mediators between an evaluative
focus and behavioral tendencies (Böhm 2003; Böhm and Pfister 2008). We exam-
ined each path separately: when considering the consequentialist path, we tested
whether a stronger evaluative focus on negative consequences would lead to more
intense consequence-based emotions and whether these in turn would trigger more
pronounced tendencies to help; considering the deontological path, we tested
whether a stronger focus on violations of moral rights would lead to more intense
morality-based emotions and whether these would mediate the occurrence of more
pronounced tendencies to behave aggressively. As measures in these analyses, we
used the respective argument ratings as indicators of an evaluative focus plus the
corresponding emotion indices (see Table 1) and behavioral indices (see Table 2).
Table 5 shows the results of the mediation analyses, separately for the island and
the oil scenarios. The mediated effect represents the effect of a focus on behavior
via the mediating role of emotions; the partial direct effect represents the effect of a
focus on behavior, controlling for the mediated effect of emotions. The total effect
was computed as the sum of the mediated and direct effects. With respect to the con-
sequentialist path, we found that the mediated and direct effects were significant for
the island as well as for the oil scenario. For both scenarios, the mediated effect was
substantially smaller than the direct effect, suggesting that emotions do play a medi-
ating role but are not strictly necessary for eliciting helping behavior.
With respect to the deontological path, we found a significant mediated effect of
moral emotions for both the island and oil scenarios; the direct effect was non-
significant for both scenarios. This suggests that, unlike the consequentialist path,
for the deontological path, the experience of morality-based emotions was necessary
to elicit the relevant behaviors; the mere focus on moral violations per se did not
directly lead to agent-related behaviors unless it elicited corresponding morality-
based emotions.
Discussion
Our results clearly support the distinction between consequentialist and deontologi-
cal modes of information processing in environmental risk evaluations. We identified
two types of emotional reactions as well as two types of behavioral tendencies that
corresponded with this distinction. The distinction between consequence-based and
morality-based emotions has been replicated in several studies now (Böhm 2003;
Böhm and Pfister 2000, 2005; Hendrickx and Nicolaij 2004) as has the distinction
between consequence-related and agent-related behaviors (Böhm and Pfister 2000,
2005). We found that consequentialist and deontological processing were influenced
by features of the risk such as its causal structure and by the situational context such
as the social role of the evaluator. A risk’s causal structure was found to be a partic-
ularly influential factor. This again replicates the results of earlier studies (Böhm and
Pfister 2000, 2005) and demonstrates that morality is an important aspect that people
consider when evaluating risks (Ericson and Doyle 2003; Sjöberg 2000) and
that moral considerations differ from consequentialist evaluations such as risk
evaluations.
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Consequentialist evaluations turned out to be generally very strong and mostly
unaffected by the risk’s causal structure or by the perceiver’s social role. The same
result was reported by Böhm and Pfister (2005) who used similar materials. It is
possible that we did not find any effects on consequentialist evaluations because the
two core events that we chose for the scenarios (i.e. oil pollution of the sea and the
wearing away of an island’s coastal rocks) were perceived to be of such high risk
that there was no room for our experimental manipulations to affect consequentialist
evaluations. Future research is needed to determine whether lower risk events pro-
duce different results. The presence of a ceiling effect was supported by the fact that
the means of the consequentialist evaluations were generally in the upper ranges of
the rating scales (Figure 4).
Most of the effects of causal structure concerned deontological evaluations
(Table 3), which were more pronounced for anthropogenic risks than for risks
caused by natural processes. Anthropogenic risks were evaluated as more morally
blameworthy, aroused more intense morality-based emotions such as outrage, and
triggered stronger tendencies to engage in agent-related behaviors such as aggression
than natural risks.
The distinction between anthropogenic and natural causation seems to be a fun-
damental point that was already made in early risk perception research (e.g. Slovic,
Kunreuther, and White 1974). A number of studies have shown that people perceive
and react to anthropogenic vs. naturally caused risk events in very different ways
and that this difference can be seen on the level of cognitive judgments, emotional
reactions, and behaviors. For example, the same loss (e.g. loss of a herd of elks) is
perceived to be more serious when it is caused by humans than by nature (Brown
et al. 2005); technological (i.e. human-caused) disasters lead to more chronic stress
reactions than natural disasters (Baum, Fleming, and Davidson 1983); and the
strength with which people believe that humans are the cause of climate change pre-
dicts their level of support for public action (van der Linden et al. 2015). Our model
extends the understanding of the difference between anthropogenic and natural risks
by explicating the different psychological processes that are triggered by these two
types of risks. Anthropogenic causation allows for the ascription of responsibility,
which focuses anger reactions and affects behavioral intentions (Nerb and Spada
2001). Anthropogenic causation adds a moral component to the evaluative process
that is absent for natural risks. This moral component changes the evaluator’s evalu-
ative mode by directing attention toward the involved actors and their actions and to
the question of whether their behavior is morally adequate. The mediation analyses
suggest that morality-based emotions serve as essential mediators in the transition
from moral judgments to corresponding behaviors. The type of emotion that is
aroused in this process plays a pivotal role in shaping behavioral reactions, which
we will discuss in more detail below.
We found fewer effects of the evaluator’s social role. The roles differed in the
hypothesized direction with respect to the importance that the people who took on
these roles ascribed to a deontological argument when asked to form an opinion
about the risk event. There was a tendency, also in the hypothesized direction, of the
people in the various social roles to differ in how morally blameworthy they consid-
ered the event. Social role weakly affected agent-related (aggression) and had a
strong effect on consequence-related (help) behavioral tendencies (Figure 6).
In general, the role induction via instructions may have been weaker for social
role than for causal structure; it may have been difficult for students to relate to the
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role of a mayor or a parent, maybe more so than to the role of an environmental
activist. A next step in future research might be to study people who are in these
roles in their real lives – at the expense of giving up the experimental control that
comes with inducing the roles rather than observing them.
The patterns of consequentialist and deontological evaluations that we found
have important implications for our understanding of the evaluative process.
Because the judgment of moral blameworthiness of the risk event was affected by
the risk’s cause but not by its consequences, this indicates that the common sense
concept of morality is deontological rather than consequentialist (Baron and Spranca
1997; Bartels and Medin 2007).
Consequentialist evaluations and deontological evaluations are not antagonistic.
We conceive of them as dual processes, but that does not mean that one precludes
the other or that people focus strictly on either consequences or morality but not on
both. Our results suggest that a consequentialist evaluation always takes place when
people are faced with a risk event. It may well be the case that a certain amount of
risk is a prerequisite for moral evaluations. If nothing serious can happen, there may
be no ground for moral considerations. For strong moral evaluations to take place,
additional conditions besides serious potential consequences then have to be met,
for example, human causation in the case of environmental risk events. Conceptual-
izing one of the dual processes as the default and as the prevalent one and the other
as intervening under certain conditions is similar to the dual system theories
that have been proposed with respect to automatic and deliberative processing
(Kahneman 2011).
Our model assigns a pivotal role to emotions in risk evaluations. Many other
approaches that discuss the role of emotions in judgment and decision-making focus
merely on general positive or negative affect (e.g. Peters et al. 2006). Our results
support approaches that emphasize the importance of specific emotions such as fear
or anger (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001) and suggest that the cognitive basis of
specific emotions and thus their semantics is crucial in that different specific emo-
tions that share the same valence (e.g. fear and outrage) have different behavioral
consequences. This is in line with the basic assumptions of appraisal theories of
emotion (Frijda 2006; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988) according to which specific
emotions are aroused by specific cognitive appraisals and trigger specific behavioral
tendencies. We applied this general framework to the domain of risk evaluations and
specified which appraisal processes, specific emotions, and types of behavioral ten-
dencies were relevant in the domain of environmental risks. We showed that help is
associated with consequence-related emotions (e.g. fear), which in turn are associ-
ated with consequentialist judgments. Aggression, by contrast, was related to moral-
ity-based emotions (e.g. outrage) that result from moral judgments.
Different specific emotions have been shown to have different functions in guid-
ing decisions and behavior (Pfister and Böhm 2008; Zeelenberg et al. 2008). Study-
ing specific emotions will help improve our understanding of risk evaluations
because specific emotions allow us to specify the motivational processes that link
risk perception and risk behavior. Our results suggest that this link is particularly
strong for morality-based emotions and associated behaviors. Hence, emotions may
be a key to effective risk communication because emotions are necessary for deci-
sion-making. This may be particularly true when considering moral decisions, for
example, about environmental risks such as climate change, where the public tends
to be disengaged (Roeser 2012). This general lack of engagement in the climate
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change issue has been attributed to a lack of emotional involvement (Weber 2006).
Messages that foster emotional involvement may thus be particularly promising in
risk communication efforts.
Our results showed that consequentialist evaluations are generally quite strong
compared with deontological evaluations. This suggests that people may be espe-
cially susceptible to messages that emphasize negative future consequences and con-
sequence-based emotions (e.g. fear, sadness) in accordance with prospect theory’s
notion of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). A recent study indeed
showed that drawing attention to future environmental damage and asking people to
anticipate the emotions that they would experience if they were to live in this future
was the most effective strategy for promoting pro-environmental behavioral inten-
tions (Böhm and Pfister 2015a). On the other hand, thinking about a distant future
will likely lead to discounting processes and highly abstract construals (Frederick,
Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2003; Liberman and Trope 2014), counteracting the
motivation to act and fostering procrastination. Hence, messages that focus on proxi-
mate consequences are likely to be more effective than messages that focus on
future consequences that are too distant (but see Pahl et al. 2014, for a discussion of
the complex interplay between time, construal, and psychological distance).
We are reluctant to recommend emphasizing negative consequence-based emo-
tions too much because other research has shown that dire messages about the future
have the potential to backfire (Feinberg and Willer 2011); similarly, Ruiter et al.
(2014) reported meta-analytic evidence that fear appeals might lead to defensive
responses rather than self-protective actions. A better alternative may be to focus on
positive emotions (Stern 2012). We have not discussed positive emotions in this arti-
cle so far, but they can be easily incorporated into the model that we presented. Posi-
tive consequence-based emotions result from anticipating or experiencing either
positive consequences or the non-occurrence of negative consequences (e.g. happi-
ness, relief, and hope). Positive consequence-based emotions can be expected to
motivate prosocial behaviors that are aimed at producing positive or preventing nega-
tive consequences (Telle and Pfister 2015). A recent study by Smith and Leiserowitz
(2014) also pointed in this direction by showing that hope was strongly associated
with support for climate change policies.
According to the results of our study, deontological messages that foster moral-
ity-based emotions should most easily resonate with an audience when the anthro-
pogenic origin of the risk is emphasized and an agent who can be ascribed
responsibility is specified (Böhm and Pfister 2000). The scenarios that we used in
this study portrayed protagonists other than the study participants so that the relevant
emotions and behaviors implied blame assignment to others. Moral outrage and
aggression are quite destructive reactions, though. A more constructive communica-
tion strategy would be to emphasize the causal role and moral responsibility of the
self. This arouses self-directed morality-based emotions such as guilt or regret
(Böhm 2003) and should trigger behaviors such as repair, restoration, or redemption.
For environmental behaviors, the relationship between guilt and repair was recently
documented by Harth, Leach, and Kessler (2013). Again, a promising strategy may
be to focus on positive emotions. Positive morality-based emotions (e.g. moral satis-
faction and pride) result from the perception that one has lived up to a moral stan-
dard or has acted in a morally responsible way, for example, by having done a good
deed. Positive morality-based emotions can be expected to give rise to more morally
desirable behaviors that serve to maintain a positive self-image. A natural extension
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of our model may be to include pleasant emotions and enjoyable behaviors and
might possibly reflect the light side of risk perception.
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Notes
1. In addition, we measured a number of other aspects of risk evaluation (e.g. the perceived
severity of potential consequences). These other ratings produced the same results as the
reported one, as did an aggregate index of all of these ratings. For the sake of brevity,
we report only this rating.
2. See Note 1.
3. See Note 1.
4. Note that before answering the items on perceived risk for humans, participants were
asked whether the presented scenario could have any harmful consequences for humans
at all. For those participants who answered ‘no’ to this question, perceived risk for
humans was set to zero. Likewise, the rating of perceived risk for nature was preceded
by the question of whether any harmful consequences for nature could occur at all, and
perceived risk for nature was set to zero for participants who responded ‘no.’ Excluding
these participants from the analyses rather than setting their perceived risk to zero (per-
ceived risk for humans: 60 participants for the island scenario, 8 for the oil scenario; per-
ceived risk for nature: 27 participants for the island scenario, 1 for the oil scenario) did
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Participants were asked to imagine that they were in one of three social roles. For each role,
general goals and concerns associated with this role were described in order to induce a con-
sequentialist focus for the mayor, a deontological focus for the environmental activist, and a
blended focus for the expecting parent. The instructions read as follows (translated from Ger-
man):
Mayor
Imagine that you are the mayor of a region where tourism is important. You make decisions
about the allocation of financial resources and you issue decrees. The economic growth of
the region for which you are responsible matters a great deal to you. You believe that envi-
ronmental damage in your region would constitute a great economic loss.
Expecting parent
Imagine that you or your partner is expecting a child. You reflect intensely upon your upcom-
ing responsibilities. It matters a great deal to you to raise your child in a healthy and intact
natural environment so that he or she is not harmed. You believe that future generations have
the right to live in unspoiled nature.
Environmental activist
Imagine that you are an environmental activist. You have been involved with Greenpeace for
many years. You fight against the exploitation of nature by humans. The balance of nature
matters a great deal to you. You believe that humans have no right to dominate nature.
Scenarios
The scenarios were adopted from Böhm and Pfister (2005). In the island scenario, the geo-
graphical institute in Kiel, Germany, reports that the coastal rocks of Tressnitz island are
worn away. Depending on the causal structure condition, this is reported to be caused either
by strong waves produced by fast private boats and yachts (anthropogenic causation in ME-
and MEM-Risks) or by natural currents in the sea (natural causation in EM-Risks). Again,
depending on the causal structure condition, this is predicted to lead either to the extinction
of many bird species because the island’s rocks provide unique conditions for these animals
(consequences affect nature in ME-Risks) or to the evacuation of many people because their
homes will be destroyed (consequences affect humans in EM- and MEM-Risks).
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The oil scenario reports that a Danish research boat from the renowned institute for eco-
logical research SEASEARCH discovered in the North Sea either oil barrels on the sea floor
(anthropogenic causation in ME- and MEM-Risks) or natural oil resources that are located
just underneath the sea floor due to a recent earthquake (natural causation in EM-Risks). A
representative of the institute reports that the oil will dissipate into the sea, with devastating
consequences for the ecosystem. The predicted consequences are either the deaths of many
birds and marine animals (consequences affect nature in ME-Risks) or severe damages to
fishing and tourism so that many people will lose their jobs and income (consequences affect
humans in EM- and MEM-Risks).
For each of the two scenarios, three versions were constructed according to the three
levels of causal structure.
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